With survival at stake, Iran likely to continue fighting

Joint Israeli and US air and missile strikes on Tehran have assassinated Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader of 37 years. These strikes were part of a larger aerial attack across Iran’s centres of military and political power, which have also killed its other top defence officials. Despite this, Iran has targeted US bases in every Gulf country as part of a sustained region-wide retaliation. Why couldn’t this expanding conflict be prevented? ## Commitment trap Unlike in June 2025, the key difference is that the current war has arguably broken out due to a breakthrough in US-Iran talks — not a breakdown. This was evident in that Oman, which holds discretion in high regard as a serious mediator, broke all precedent on February 28 by making public the details of the US-Iran negotiations. This included Iran agreeing to zero stockpiling of nuclear material, down-blending its existing 60% enriched stockpile to irreversible fuel, and allowing US inspectors access to its nuclear sites. He asserted that the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal (which US President Donald Trump has sought to outdo) did not contain such extensive Iranian commitments, making it a significantly better deal for the US. Muscat was evidently aware of Washington’s plan to attack Iran, reflecting that the White House was operating as if in a commitment trap. For Trump, even a deal with such unprecedented terms would not allow him to save face. This led to an attack without guarantees of meeting the strategic objective of “regime change”. In June 2025, Washington wanted the destruction of Iran’s nuclear programme. Despite evidence of Iran continuing to retain 60% enriched uranium, the US could still use the significant damage at Fordow to maintain that the Iranian nuclear programme was “obliterated”. Now, the US cited the need to aid regime change, saying that the latest round of negotiations did not yield an agreement. While Trump can still claim victory with Khamenei’s death, the regime surviving with new — though transitional — leadership will be evidence of its resilience. It will represent change within the system, not of the system. Rather, Tehran has significantly fewer reasons to show restraint and more to follow through with its threat of massive retaliation. ## Punishment as strategy The Iranian threat was intended to be a deterrent: to prevent the US attack. Iran could not afford to replicate its strategy from June 2025, when it retaliated symbolically to US strikes on its nuclear sites by targeting an air base in Qatar. Washington was likely aware of this Iranian predicament. Given Trump’s fresh need for a decisive win besides the military build-up, the US strike could no longer be symbolic. Now, the US would need to attempt to draw maximum gains through airpower alone, since boots on the ground remained a non-option. So, Washington began preparing for Iran’s massive retaliation: the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group parked itself next to Israel — not Iran — since Washington knew that Tehran would strike Israel in response. However, Iran’s retaliation has incorporated both the use of missile/drone barrages to cause significant damage to a set of targets across the Gulf region, targeting both military and civilian sites. In a historic first, the IRGC also announced a halt to oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of global oil trade. All this reflects Iran’s desire to impose costs not only on the US and Israel, but also on Washington’s regional allies. The US-Israeli attacks have also not brought forth organised coherent Iranian opposition, which can fight and replace the well-entrenched regime. This is in line with past precedent. Moreover, striking civilian areas in Iran complicates the prospects of Trump’s call for systemic change. The war’s continuation increases the costs significantly for the US and tests Iran’s capacities. But given only Iran is fighting for survival, it has far greater stakes and thus more incentive to continue attacks until Washington backs down.