UPSC Insights SECURE SYNOPSIS : 31 May 2025
Kartavya Desk Staff
NOTE: Please remember that following ‘answers’ are NOT ‘model answers’. They are NOT synopsis too if we go by definition of the term. What we are providing is content that both meets demand of the question and at the same
General Studies – 1
Q1. In what ways does the legacy of Sangam poets highlight the interdependence of ecology, economy, and ethics in ancient society? (10 M)
Introduction The Sangam age nurtured a deep civilisational wisdom where nature was not external but integral to moral order and prosperity. Its poets offered a rare synthesis of ecological reverence, ethical conduct, and economic sustainability, making their legacy both timeless and timely.
Ecology and ethics as inseparable
• Eco-zones guiding moral conduct: The five thinais prescribed codes of behavior suited to ecological settings. Eg: Kurinji (mountains) linked with union and simplicity, while Marutham (river plains) reflected abundance and duty in agriculture (Tolkappiyam, 3rd century BCE).
• Eg: Kurinji (mountains) linked with union and simplicity, while Marutham (river plains) reflected abundance and duty in agriculture (Tolkappiyam, 3rd century BCE).
• Tree worship as ecological ethics: Sacred trees were revered as divine abodes, instilling bio-cultural respect and restraint. Eg: Sthalavriksha tradition in temples ensured the conservation of local flora (Silappadhikaram, 2nd century CE).
• Eg: Sthalavriksha tradition in temples ensured the conservation of local flora (Silappadhikaram, 2nd century CE).
Ecological prosperity as foundation of economy
• Rain and agriculture as drivers of prosperity: Rainfall was seen as the ethical pivot of agrarian economy and social justice. Eg: In Tirukkural’s Van Sirappu, Thiruvalluvar states: “There is no world without water”—a direct moral-economy linkage.
• Eg: In Tirukkural’s Van Sirappu, Thiruvalluvar states: “There is no world without water”—a direct moral-economy linkage.
• Waterbody construction as royal duty: Good governance was judged by the creation of sustainable irrigation infrastructure. Eg: Puranaanuru praises kings who built lakes in low-lying areas, recognising water as statecraft.
• Eg: Puranaanuru praises kings who built lakes in low-lying areas, recognising water as statecraft.
• Generosity rooted in environmental empathy: Ethics of sharing were extended even to nature. Eg: Vel Pāri, a chieftain of Sangam age, gave his chariot to a climber plant—highlighting a value-driven ecological economy.
• Eg: Vel Pāri, a chieftain of Sangam age, gave his chariot to a climber plant—highlighting a value-driven ecological economy.
Ethics shaping societal well-being through ecology
• Moral failure tied to ecological collapse: Literature warns of ethical degradation in times of environmental failure. Eg: Akanaanuru compares lake guards with mothers, symbolising moral duty to ecological guardianship.
• Eg: Akanaanuru compares lake guards with mothers, symbolising moral duty to ecological guardianship.
• Environmental justice as part of good kingship: Prosperity was believed to flow from ecological balance and virtuous rule. Eg: Avvaiyar’s verse links ridge health → water retention → crops → public welfare → king’s greatness (Sangam age).
• Eg: Avvaiyar’s verse links ridge health → water retention → crops → public welfare → king’s greatness (Sangam age).
Conclusion The Sangam legacy offers a civilisational model of harmony between nature, ethics, and economy—where prosperity was not extracted but cultivated through ecological responsibility. Reviving such ethical ecology can anchor India’s future climate and cultural policies.
Q2. India’s current urban growth trajectory is neither spatially balanced nor socially inclusive. Analyse this in light of the Urban Challenge Fund and suggest a roadmap for equitable urbanisation. (15 M)
Introduction India’s urban transformation has largely favoured megacities, sidelining small towns and peri-urban regions. This has deepened spatial inequalities and excluded vulnerable populations from the benefits of urban growth.
Spatial imbalance and social exclusion in India’s urban trajectory
• Metro-centric investments and regional disparity: Infrastructure and capital flow have disproportionately favoured Tier-1 cities. Eg: As per World Bank (2025), over 70% of city infrastructure investment between 2011–2023 was directed to top 50 cities, sidelining over 7000 small towns.
• Eg: As per World Bank (2025), over 70% of city infrastructure investment between 2011–2023 was directed to top 50 cities, sidelining over 7000 small towns.
• Invisibility of small towns in urban policy: Many small towns remain unclassified or misclassified as rural, limiting funding. Eg: A 2023 CPR study showed that nearly 28% of urban-like settlements were not recognised as urban in Census 2011, blocking them from urban schemes.
• Eg: A 2023 CPR study showed that nearly 28% of urban-like settlements were not recognised as urban in Census 2011, blocking them from urban schemes.
• Exclusionary urbanisation and informal sector neglect: Migrant workers and slum dwellers are left out of formal housing, services, and employment. Eg: The COVID-19 lockdown (2020) revealed the lack of basic entitlements for urban informal workers, triggering mass reverse migration.
• Eg: The COVID-19 lockdown (2020) revealed the lack of basic entitlements for urban informal workers, triggering mass reverse migration.
• Weak decentralisation and urban local body capacity: Most ULBs lack autonomy, staffing, and revenue powers to serve growing populations. Eg: According to 15th Finance Commission (2021), ULBs account for only 0.7% of GDP, far below global average of 2–3%.
• Eg: According to 15th Finance Commission (2021), ULBs account for only 0.7% of GDP, far below global average of 2–3%.
• Gender and caste barriers in urban access: Poor women, SCs, and STs face higher barriers to housing, employment, and mobility. Eg: NSSO (2018) data showed that SC households in urban India had 28% lower access to piped water and sanitation than general households.
• Eg: NSSO (2018) data showed that SC households in urban India had 28% lower access to piped water and sanitation than general households.
Urban Challenge Fund: Scope and limitations
• Shift in focus toward emerging cities: The fund recognises the developmental needs of small and medium towns. Eg: Urban Challenge Fund (2025) allocated ₹10,000 crore in first phase, with 25% grant and mandatory 50% funding from bonds, PPPs, or loans.
• Eg: Urban Challenge Fund (2025) allocated ₹10,000 crore in first phase, with 25% grant and mandatory 50% funding from bonds, PPPs, or loans.
• Push for innovation and financing diversification: It incentivises bankable, locally designed infrastructure models. Eg: The fund mandates PPP and bond financing, encouraging market-based urban governance beyond traditional state dependence.
• Eg: The fund mandates PPP and bond financing, encouraging market-based urban governance beyond traditional state dependence.
• Limited scale relative to need: Investment remains far below required urban infrastructure spending. Eg: World Bank estimates (2023) indicate India needs ₹70 lakh crore over 15 years, against current annual allocation of just ₹10,000 crore.
• Eg: World Bank estimates (2023) indicate India needs ₹70 lakh crore over 15 years, against current annual allocation of just ₹10,000 crore.
• Insufficient ULB readiness for fund absorption: Most small-town ULBs lack technical and administrative capacity. Eg: Only 10 largest ULBs were able to spend two-thirds of their capital budgets in past 3 years .
• Eg: Only 10 largest ULBs were able to spend two-thirds of their capital budgets in past 3 years .
• No social equity mandate in project selection: The fund lacks explicit criteria to prioritise inclusion of marginalised groups. Eg: Unlike Jaga Mission in Odisha, there is no built-in social targeting mechanism in the Urban Challenge Fund guidelines.
• Eg: Unlike Jaga Mission in Odisha, there is no built-in social targeting mechanism in the Urban Challenge Fund guidelines.
Roadmap for equitable urbanisation
• Redefine urban classification criteria: Update definitions to include functional urban areas and census towns. Eg: NITI Aayog’s Urban Reclassification Report (2022) proposed recognising urban characteristics like density and employment pattern, not just administrative status.
• Eg: NITI Aayog’s Urban Reclassification Report (2022) proposed recognising urban characteristics like density and employment pattern, not just administrative status.
• Empower and reform urban local bodies: Transfer financial, functional, and staffing powers to make cities self-reliant. Eg: The 74th Constitutional Amendment (1992) mandates decentralisation, but MoHUA data (2023) shows poor compliance in staffing and finances.
• Eg: The 74th Constitutional Amendment (1992) mandates decentralisation, but MoHUA data (2023) shows poor compliance in staffing and finances.
• Link infrastructure with social equity indicators: Mandate inclusive planning to benefit SC/STs, women, and urban poor. Eg: Indore’s Smart City Plan used gender audits and built women-only mobility zones improving access to jobs and safety.
• Eg: Indore’s Smart City Plan used gender audits and built women-only mobility zones improving access to jobs and safety.
• Prioritise small town clusters and regional linkages: Invest in regional hubs that connect rural and urban flows. Eg: The Shyama Prasad Mukherji Rurban Mission created integrated rural-urban clusters in states like Gujarat and Telangana.
• Eg: The Shyama Prasad Mukherji Rurban Mission created integrated rural-urban clusters in states like Gujarat and Telangana.
• Create capacity-building cells in emerging cities: Institutional support is needed for project design, finance, and execution. Eg: Kochi’s Centre for Urban Innovation (2023) partners with academic institutions to build technical capacity in small ULBs.
• Eg: Kochi’s Centre for Urban Innovation (2023) partners with academic institutions to build technical capacity in small ULBs.
Conclusion India’s urban transition needs to evolve from being metro-led and exclusionary to distributed and inclusive, with small towns as active engines of growth. A resilient, rights-based, and regionally balanced urban model is the real opportunity that the Urban Challenge Fund must now deliver.
General Studies – 2
Q3. Despite strong legal safeguards, child trafficking remains rampant in India. Analyse the key reasons behind its persistence. Discuss the role of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) in tackling this challenge. Suggest a comprehensive strategy to eliminate child trafficking. (15 M)
Introduction Despite a robust legal framework, child trafficking in India persists due to systemic socio-economic and enforcement gaps, as highlighted by the 964-child rescue operation by NCPCR in 2025.
Key reasons for persistence of child trafficking
• Poverty and economic distress: Vulnerable families often fall prey to traffickers offering livelihood promises. Eg: ILO 2023 Report shows India accounts for 11.3 million child labourers, mainly trafficked from poor rural families.
• Eg: ILO 2023 Report shows India accounts for 11.3 million child labourers, mainly trafficked from poor rural families.
• Weak local enforcement and coordination: Lack of inter-state coordination and undertrained local police hampers timely action. Eg: Bihar’s Saran district rescue in May 2025 involved coordination across three police stations after NCPCR’s intervention.
• Eg: Bihar’s Saran district rescue in May 2025 involved coordination across three police stations after NCPCR’s intervention.
• Demand in informal and exploitative sectors: Child trafficking is fuelled by demand in sex trade, domestic work, forced marriages, and bonded labour. Eg: National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB 2022) reports a steady rise in trafficking linked to sexual exploitation and labour rackets.
• Eg: National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB 2022) reports a steady rise in trafficking linked to sexual exploitation and labour rackets.
• Lack of community awareness and reporting: Social stigma and normalisation of child labour prevent early intervention. Eg: In many rural areas, orchestra performances using minor girls go unreported due to local complicity and silence.
• Eg: In many rural areas, orchestra performances using minor girls go unreported due to local complicity and silence.
• Digital vulnerability and online luring: Technology is increasingly misused to traffic children via social media platforms. Eg: Interpol’s 2024 warning flagged India among the top 10 countries where traffickers use encrypted apps to lure minors.
• Eg: Interpol’s 2024 warning flagged India among the top 10 countries where traffickers use encrypted apps to lure minors.
Role of the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR)
• Monitoring statutory compliance: Ensures implementation of child protection laws like JJ Act, POCSO, and RTE Act. Eg: NCPCR intervened under Section 13 of the CPCR Act, 2005 to direct SP of Saran for immediate rescue in May 2025.
• Eg: NCPCR intervened under Section 13 of the CPCR Act, 2005 to direct SP of Saran for immediate rescue in May 2025.
• Establishment of Anti-Child Trafficking Cell: A specialised body created for coordination, real-time rescue, and inter-agency convergence. Eg: Since its formation, the Anti-Child Trafficking Cell has rescued 964 children across India (NCPCR).
• Eg: Since its formation, the Anti-Child Trafficking Cell has rescued 964 children across India (NCPCR).
• Field-based inspection and suo motu action: NCPCR can directly act on inputs from NGOs and initiate field rescues. Eg: In Bihar 2025, it acted on NGO reports of girls being forced into obscene performances.
• Eg: In Bihar 2025, it acted on NGO reports of girls being forced into obscene performances.
• Ensuring rehabilitation and restoration: Coordinates with Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) for psychosocial care and reintegration. Eg: All 17 girls rescued in Saran were presented before CWC and are now under supervised rehabilitation.
• Eg: All 17 girls rescued in Saran were presented before CWC and are now under supervised rehabilitation.
• Capacity building and state coordination: Works with State Commissions and District Child Protection Units (DCPUs) for training and sensitisation. Eg: In 2024, training workshops for CWCs and police officials were held in collaboration with NIPCCD (National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development).
• Eg: In 2024, training workshops for CWCs and police officials were held in collaboration with NIPCCD (National Institute of Public Cooperation and Child Development).
Comprehensive strategy to eliminate child trafficking
• Strengthen grassroots surveillance systems: Empower gram panchayats and school networks to report vulnerabilities. Eg: West Bengal’s Swayangsiddha scheme uses adolescent groups to prevent child marriage and trafficking.
• Eg: West Bengal’s Swayangsiddha scheme uses adolescent groups to prevent child marriage and trafficking.
• Digitised inter-state tracking systems: Real-time child tracking using centralised portals and Aadhaar-linked monitoring. Eg: TrackChild portal maintained by the Ministry of Women and Child Development can be expanded with predictive analytics.
• Eg: TrackChild portal maintained by the Ministry of Women and Child Development can be expanded with predictive analytics.
• Rehabilitation-linked rescue protocols: Ensure rescue is followed by long-term psychological, educational, and vocational support. Eg: JJ Act Section 39 mandates individual care plans post-rescue—this needs better funding and execution.
• Eg: JJ Act Section 39 mandates individual care plans post-rescue—this needs better funding and execution.
• Dedicated anti-trafficking units and courts: Fast-track courts and district-level task forces for quicker justice and prevention. Eg: Justice Verma Committee (2013) recommended fast-track mechanisms for crimes involving vulnerable groups.
• Eg: Justice Verma Committee (2013) recommended fast-track mechanisms for crimes involving vulnerable groups.
• Comprehensive awareness and media literacy: Campaigns targeting at-risk communities and online platforms for safe internet use. Eg: National Commission for Women’s cyber safety awareness campaign (2023) can be adapted for children by NCPCR.
• Eg: National Commission for Women’s cyber safety awareness campaign (2023) can be adapted for children by NCPCR.
Conclusion Child trafficking must be treated not just as a crime but as a structural governance failure. A rights-based, community-anchored, and digitally enabled framework—with NCPCR as a central node—is key to ending this systemic exploitation.
4. In recent years, constitutional posts have become battlegrounds of political partisanship. Evaluate how the politicisation of high constitutional authorities affects India’s federal balance and democratic ethos. Suggest institutional mechanisms to restore neutrality and public trust. (15 M)
Introduction
India’s constitutional architecture relies on the neutral functioning of high offices to preserve democratic legitimacy and federal harmony. When these posts turn partisan, they distort institutional balance and erode citizen trust.
Impact on federal balance
• Undermining cooperative federalism: Partisan conduct disrupts Centre–State coordination and disturbs federal harmony. Eg: The withholding of assent by governors in cases like Tamil Nadu’s NEET Exemption Bill (2021) weakened the spirit of federal cooperation.
• Eg: The withholding of assent by governors in cases like Tamil Nadu’s NEET Exemption Bill (2021) weakened the spirit of federal cooperation.
• Erosion of institutional checks: Constitutional authorities act as federal safety valves, but politicisation weakens their role. Eg: Lack of consultation with States in setting up inter-state river boards, e.g., Cauvery dispute, undermined cooperative mechanisms.
• Eg: Lack of consultation with States in setting up inter-state river boards, e.g., Cauvery dispute, undermined cooperative mechanisms.
• Central overreach through constitutional offices: These posts are often misused to interfere in State-level politics. Eg: The imposition of President’s Rule in Arunachal Pradesh (2016) was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional overreach.
• Eg: The imposition of President’s Rule in Arunachal Pradesh (2016) was struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional overreach.
• Stalling of state legislations: Political bias leads to delay in giving assent or referring bills to the President. Eg: Kerala’s University Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2022 was delayed by the Governor, impacting State autonomy.
• Eg: Kerala’s University Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2022 was delayed by the Governor, impacting State autonomy.
• Misuse of discretionary powers: Discretionary powers are used in a politically selective manner, leading to asymmetry. Eg: Delay in deciding disqualification petitions by the Speaker in Maharashtra (2022) disrupted constitutional continuity.
• Eg: Delay in deciding disqualification petitions by the Speaker in Maharashtra (2022) disrupted constitutional continuity.
Impact on democratic ethos
• Loss of public faith in impartiality: Perceived bias damages citizen confidence in constitutional institutions. Eg: The 2024 ADR report flagged public distrust in institutions like the ECI during model code violation cases.
• Eg: The 2024 ADR report flagged public distrust in institutions like the ECI during model code violation cases.
• Manipulation of legislative processes: Presiding officers act in a partisan manner, undermining deliberative democracy. Eg: Rajasthan Assembly Speaker’s conduct (2020) in delaying disqualification decisions raised neutrality concerns.
• Eg: Rajasthan Assembly Speaker’s conduct (2020) in delaying disqualification decisions raised neutrality concerns.
• Weakening of electoral integrity: Politicised authorities tilt the electoral playing field and affect free and fair elections. Eg: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the SC ordered an independent panel for EC appointments to ensure neutrality.
• Eg: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), the SC ordered an independent panel for EC appointments to ensure neutrality.
• Subversion of separation of powers: When offices exceed their constitutional mandate, it disturbs institutional boundaries. Eg: The Governor’s meeting with opposition leaders in Maharashtra (2019) undermined the neutrality of Raj Bhavan.
• Eg: The Governor’s meeting with opposition leaders in Maharashtra (2019) undermined the neutrality of Raj Bhavan.
• Stifling of opposition space: Constitutional mechanisms are used selectively to target opposition-led states and leaders. Eg: Frequent ED/CBI raids against opposition leaders with tacit institutional backing reflect institutional bias.
• Eg: Frequent ED/CBI raids against opposition leaders with tacit institutional backing reflect institutional bias.
Institutional mechanisms to restore neutrality and trust
• Independent appointment commissions: Ensure bipartisan and transparent selection for key constitutional roles. Eg: The 2023 Supreme Court directive created a panel including PM, LoP and CJI for appointing Election Commissioners.
• Eg: The 2023 Supreme Court directive created a panel including PM, LoP and CJI for appointing Election Commissioners.
• Fixed and secure tenure safeguards: Reduces political pressure and enhances independence of officeholders. Eg: The Second ARC (2007) recommended fixed tenure for constitutional authorities and civil servants.
• Eg: The Second ARC (2007) recommended fixed tenure for constitutional authorities and civil servants.
• Parliamentary oversight and accountability: Increases transparency through bipartisan legislative review. Eg: The UK model of parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments ensures neutrality through cross-party checks.
• Eg: The UK model of parliamentary scrutiny of public appointments ensures neutrality through cross-party checks.
• Judicially enforceable codes of conduct: Clearly define constitutional roles and ensure adherence to ethical standards. Eg: The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) recommended binding codes of conduct for constitutional functionaries.
• Eg: The Venkatachaliah Commission (2002) recommended binding codes of conduct for constitutional functionaries.
• Strengthening institutional autonomy: Financial and administrative independence is essential to reduce executive influence. Eg: The 255th Law Commission Report (2015) suggested placing ECI expenditure under the Consolidated Fund to enhance autonomy.
• Eg: The 255th Law Commission Report (2015) suggested placing ECI expenditure under the Consolidated Fund to enhance autonomy.
Conclusion
The health of a constitutional democracy lies in the non-partisan conduct of its highest offices. Institutionalising neutrality, transparency, and public accountability is vital to renew the citizen’s trust and sustain the spirit of the Constitution.
Q5. How does India utilise inter-parliamentary diplomacy to complement its foreign policy goals? Assess the role of platforms like the BRICS Parliamentary Forum. (10 M)
Introduction
India increasingly uses parliamentary diplomacy to reinforce its global identity as a democratic, consensus-building, and norm-shaping actor — a vital complement to conventional state-led diplomacy.
India’s use of inter-parliamentary diplomacy for foreign policy
• Showcasing democratic values globally: Parliamentary delegations project India’s pluralistic credentials in international arenas. Eg: 2023 G20 Parliament Speakers’ Summit (P20) in New Delhi highlighted India’s parliamentary strength and federal balance.
• Eg: 2023 G20 Parliament Speakers’ Summit (P20) in New Delhi highlighted India’s parliamentary strength and federal balance.
• Diversifying diplomatic channels: Legislator-led forums provide alternate routes to navigate sensitive issues. Eg: India-China Parliamentary Friendship Group (2021) helped maintain engagement post-Galwan tensions.
• Eg: India-China Parliamentary Friendship Group (2021) helped maintain engagement post-Galwan tensions.
• Advancing global south solidarity: MPs advocate equitable development, technology access, and debt reform. Eg: Indian MPs at 2022 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) demanded vaccine equity and technology transfer for developing nations.
• Eg: Indian MPs at 2022 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) demanded vaccine equity and technology transfer for developing nations.
• Gaining support for strategic priorities: Parliamentary outreach builds backing for India’s UNSC and multilateral reform agenda. Eg: Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) 2022 saw Indian MPs push for reforms in global governance institutions.
• Eg: Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) 2022 saw Indian MPs push for reforms in global governance institutions.
• Institutionalising long-term partnerships: Regular parliamentary exchanges create sustained goodwill beyond changing governments. Eg: India-EU Parliament Dialogue (2023) institutionalised cooperation on climate, cyber law, and trade ethics.
• Eg: India-EU Parliament Dialogue (2023) institutionalised cooperation on climate, cyber law, and trade ethics.
Role of BRICS Parliamentary Forum
• Platform for reform-oriented advocacy: It helps India push for restructuring of global institutions like the UN and IMF. Eg: Om Birla’s 2025 address in Brasilia stressed reform of multilateral peace and security architecture.
• Eg: Om Birla’s 2025 address in Brasilia stressed reform of multilateral peace and security architecture.
• Legitimising emerging economy consensus: Facilitates BRICS-wide legislative support for economic multipolarity. Eg: Joint 2025 BRICS Forum declaration backed a new development model centred on sustainability and equity.
• Eg: Joint 2025 BRICS Forum declaration backed a new development model centred on sustainability and equity.
• Addressing transnational policy concerns: Forums offer shared space to discuss challenges like AI, climate, and health. Eg: Plenary session on Responsible AI (2025) positioned India as a leader in ethical digital governance.
• Eg: Plenary session on Responsible AI (2025) positioned India as a leader in ethical digital governance.
• Strengthening South-South inter-parliamentary ties: Builds convergence among diverse democratic and semi-democratic systems. Eg: 2023 BRICS Forum hosted by South Africa facilitated strategic cooperation on food security and green energy.
• Eg: 2023 BRICS Forum hosted by South Africa facilitated strategic cooperation on food security and green energy.
• Enhancing India’s diplomatic bandwidth: Parliamentary tracks complement MEA diplomacy and widen India’s global engagement capacity. Eg: BRICS Parliamentary Track (since 2015) allows India to influence policy debates even outside executive summits.
• Eg: BRICS Parliamentary Track (since 2015) allows India to influence policy debates even outside executive summits.
Conclusion
Parliamentary diplomacy enables India to act as a voice of consensus and democracy in a fragmented global order. The BRICS Parliamentary Forum strengthens this effort by aligning legislative influence with strategic vision.
General Studies – 3
Q6. Evaluate the performance of States in augmenting their own tax revenues since Goods and Service Tax (GST) implementation. What lessons can be drawn for future fiscal devolution frameworks? (15 M)
Introduction GST was envisaged as a game-changer in India’s fiscal landscape, but its centralised structure has challenged States’ ability to enhance their own tax base.
Positive aspects
• Moderate improvement in tax-to-GSDP ratio: States have shown partial success in improving fiscal mobilisation. Eg: Own Tax Revenue (OTR) of States rose from 6.6% of GSDP in 2017-18 to 7.2% in 2024-25 (RBI State Finances Report, 2025).
• Eg: Own Tax Revenue (OTR) of States rose from 6.6% of GSDP in 2017-18 to 7.2% in 2024-25 (RBI State Finances Report, 2025).
• Expansion of digital compliance mechanisms: States have leveraged e-way bills and analytics to plug tax leakages. Eg: Karnataka used AI-based tax intelligence tools to curb evasion and boost GST compliance (Karnataka Economic Survey, 2024-25).
• Eg: Karnataka used AI-based tax intelligence tools to curb evasion and boost GST compliance (Karnataka Economic Survey, 2024-25).
• Better mobilisation through property and excise taxes: Some States optimised non-GST revenue channels. Eg: Tamil Nadu increased its excise and stamp duty revenues despite stagnant GST growth (TN Budget, 2024-25).
• Eg: Tamil Nadu increased its excise and stamp duty revenues despite stagnant GST growth (TN Budget, 2024-25).
• Institutional reforms in tax administration: Certain States undertook restructuring for better efficiency. Eg: Odisha implemented Integrated Financial Management Systems (IFMS) to modernise tax operations.
• Eg: Odisha implemented Integrated Financial Management Systems (IFMS) to modernise tax operations.
• Use of incentive-based models: Performance-linked grants have encouraged better tax effort in some regions. Eg: 15th Finance Commission allocated Rs. 70,000 crore for States based on tax effort and population control indicators.
• Eg: 15th Finance Commission allocated Rs. 70,000 crore for States based on tax effort and population control indicators.
Challenges
• Loss of fiscal autonomy under GST: States cannot vary rates or design indirect taxes independently. Eg: Entry tax, octroi, and VAT on most goods were subsumed, limiting States’ flexibility.
• Eg: Entry tax, octroi, and VAT on most goods were subsumed, limiting States’ flexibility.
• Patchy performance across States: Wealthier States saw gains, while poorer States struggled to mobilise revenues. Eg: UP and Bihar lagged in GST compliance, widening horizontal fiscal disparities (PRS Legislative Research, 2024).
• Eg: UP and Bihar lagged in GST compliance, widening horizontal fiscal disparities (PRS Legislative Research, 2024).
• Delayed GST compensation and arrears: Compensation cess often arrived late, impacting State planning. Eg: States like Punjab and Kerala reported pending GST compensation of over Rs. 10,000 crore in FY 2023-24.
• Eg: States like Punjab and Kerala reported pending GST compensation of over Rs. 10,000 crore in FY 2023-24.
• Underperformance of GST collections: GST failed to deliver anticipated buoyancy in many States. Eg: In 2022-23, only 12 of 28 States reported GST growth above nominal GSDP rise (MoF Monthly GST Reports).
• Eg: In 2022-23, only 12 of 28 States reported GST growth above nominal GSDP rise (MoF Monthly GST Reports).
• Weak enforcement and leakages: Capacity constraints limited enforcement outside top-performing States. Eg: North-Eastern States faced chronic shortages of trained personnel and digital infrastructure.
• Eg: North-Eastern States faced chronic shortages of trained personnel and digital infrastructure.
Lessons for future fiscal devolution frameworks
• Dynamic devolution formula: Tax-sharing should reflect evolving revenue-generation and expenditure needs. Eg: Tamil Nadu’s call for 50% tax devolution highlights need for revisiting the static 41% share.
• Eg: Tamil Nadu’s call for 50% tax devolution highlights need for revisiting the static 41% share.
• Performance-linked incentives: Fiscal transfers must reward reform and compliance, not only needs. Eg: 15th Finance Commission recommended incentives for tax effort, population control, and power sector reforms.
• Eg: 15th Finance Commission recommended incentives for tax effort, population control, and power sector reforms.
• Extension of compensation mechanism: Post-2022, an alternative institutional buffer is needed for GST revenue volatility. Eg: A proposed Revenue Insurance Model could address unpredictable tax inflows (NIPFP, 2023).
• Eg: A proposed Revenue Insurance Model could address unpredictable tax inflows (NIPFP, 2023).
• Empowering GST Council and States: More frequent meetings and voting parity can restore cooperative federalism. Eg: GST Council met only once in FY 2023-24, limiting dialogue on fiscal concerns (CBIC Annual Report, 2024).
• Eg: GST Council met only once in FY 2023-24, limiting dialogue on fiscal concerns (CBIC Annual Report, 2024).
• Encouraging own revenue innovations: States must diversify fiscal instruments beyond GST. Eg: Maharashtra’s urban mining tax model and Kerala’s floor pricing for liquor show potential for innovative revenue streams.
• Eg: Maharashtra’s urban mining tax model and Kerala’s floor pricing for liquor show potential for innovative revenue streams.
Conclusion Strengthening State finances in a post-GST era demands a reimagined fiscal pact that balances autonomy with accountability—only then can true cooperative federalism thrive.
Q7. “The promise of doubling farmers’ income was ambitious but insufficiently grounded in regional realities”. Critically analyse. What institutional and structural reforms are necessary to realise this goal? (15 M)
Introduction The goal to double farmers’ income by 2022–23 shifted the national narrative from food security to income security. However, its uniform policy design underestimated India’s diverse agrarian realities. Despite this, it brought structural focus to long-neglected rural income issues.
Positive contributions of the doubling farmers’ income initiative
• Redefined policy from output to income orientation: The initiative catalysed a national shift in how farm success was measured. Eg: The Ashok Dalwai Committee (2017) identified seven income streams including agri-marketing, livestock, and cost reduction strategies.
• Eg: The Ashok Dalwai Committee (2017) identified seven income streams including agri-marketing, livestock, and cost reduction strategies.
• Scaled direct income support for marginal farmers: Smallholders gained stable income inflow irrespective of production outcomes. Eg: PM-KISAN disbursed over ₹2.80 lakh crore to around 11 crore farmers till 2024 (Ministry of Agriculture).
• Eg: PM-KISAN disbursed over ₹2.80 lakh crore to around 11 crore farmers till 2024 (Ministry of Agriculture).
• Strengthened allied sector integration: Horticulture, dairy, and aquaculture were mainstreamed as income-generating activities. Eg: Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh reported a 30–40% increase in rural income due to livestock and fisheries focus (NABARD 2023).
• Eg: Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh reported a 30–40% increase in rural income due to livestock and fisheries focus (NABARD 2023).
• Accelerated rural infrastructure development: Investment in cold chains, irrigation, and e-markets saw tangible increase. Eg: PM Krishi Sinchayi Yojana expanded micro-irrigation to over 1.3 crore hectares between 2016–23 (Ministry of Jal Shakti).
• Eg: PM Krishi Sinchayi Yojana expanded micro-irrigation to over 1.3 crore hectares between 2016–23 (Ministry of Jal Shakti).
• Created policy space for farm diversification: States initiated agroecological models and crop-neutral support schemes. Eg: Sikkim’s organic farming model led to 25% increase in per capita farm income over a decade.
• Eg: Sikkim’s organic farming model led to 25% increase in per capita farm income over a decade.
Gaps due to weak regional grounding
• Lack of agro-climatic customisation: Uniform schemes overlooked ecological and market diversity across states. Eg: Bihar and West Bengal averaged below ₹5,000/month income, while Punjab crossed ₹23,000/month (NSS-SAS 2018–19).
• Eg: Bihar and West Bengal averaged below ₹5,000/month income, while Punjab crossed ₹23,000/month (NSS-SAS 2018–19).
• Overdependence on centralised schemes: Centrally driven programmes didn’t align with local institutional capacities. Eg: Odisha had <15% enrolment under crop insurance due to mismatch with local risk profiles (CAG Report 2023).
• Eg: Odisha had <15% enrolment under crop insurance due to mismatch with local risk profiles (CAG Report 2023).
• Low agricultural GDP growth in lagging states: Weak economic fundamentals undermined income rise in key states. Eg: Madhya Pradesh saw 0.3% agricultural GDP growth (2018–20) despite high baseline productivity (MoSPI 2021).
• Eg: Madhya Pradesh saw 0.3% agricultural GDP growth (2018–20) despite high baseline productivity (MoSPI 2021).
• Non-farm income disparities across states: Uneven rural industrialisation skewed total income improvements. Eg: Uttarakhand achieved doubling target largely due to migration-led remittances, not farm sector .
• Eg: Uttarakhand achieved doubling target largely due to migration-led remittances, not farm sector .
• Neglected social and landholding disparities: Marginal farmers, women, and SC-ST groups gained less from national schemes. Eg: Income of SC and ST farmers is nearly 50% lower than general category farmers across India (NSS-SAS 2018–19).
• Eg: Income of SC and ST farmers is nearly 50% lower than general category farmers across India (NSS-SAS 2018–19).
Institutional and structural reforms required
• Institutional reforms
• State-level income enhancement blueprints: States must develop targeted strategies based on local needs. Eg: Andhra Pradesh’s Rythu Bharosa Kendras offer integrated support including input, marketing, and soil health services.
• Eg: Andhra Pradesh’s Rythu Bharosa Kendras offer integrated support including input, marketing, and soil health services.
• District convergence frameworks: Alignment across agri, irrigation, and panchayat departments is essential. Eg: The Aspirational Districts Programme uses convergence cells, which can be replicated for income planning.
• Eg: The Aspirational Districts Programme uses convergence cells, which can be replicated for income planning.
• Real-time and disaggregated data systems: Dynamic farm-level income tracking is needed for targeted interventions. Eg: NITI Aayog Data Strategy (2023) calls for farm income dashboards integrating caste, gender, and region-based data.
• Eg: NITI Aayog Data Strategy (2023) calls for farm income dashboards integrating caste, gender, and region-based data.
• Empowered state farmers’ commissions: Decentralised policy institutions should advise on evidence-based reforms. Eg: Tamil Nadu’s State Farmers Commission (2004) influenced input subsidy policy and agro-climate-specific MSPs.
• Eg: Tamil Nadu’s State Farmers Commission (2004) influenced input subsidy policy and agro-climate-specific MSPs.
• Centre–state fiscal flexibility: Outcome-based transfers should replace rigid centrally sponsored schemes. Eg: The 15th Finance Commission proposed performance-linked agri grants to incentivise state innovation.
• Eg: The 15th Finance Commission proposed performance-linked agri grants to incentivise state innovation.
• Structural reforms
• Land leasing and tenancy reform: Secure land tenure enables investment and credit access. Eg: Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh have adopted the Model Land Leasing Act (2016) for formalising tenancy.
• Eg: Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh have adopted the Model Land Leasing Act (2016) for formalising tenancy.
• Post-harvest value chain infrastructure: Improved logistics can raise farmgate prices and reduce distress sales. Eg: Operation Greens established 100 value chain clusters, though coverage in eastern India remains limited.
• Eg: Operation Greens established 100 value chain clusters, though coverage in eastern India remains limited.
• Expanded role for farmer producer organisations: FPOs improve market leverage and input access. Eg: As of 2024, 3,000 functional FPOs under the 10,000 FPOs scheme, though many face managerial gaps (SFAC Report 2024).
• Eg: As of 2024, 3,000 functional FPOs under the 10,000 FPOs scheme, though many face managerial gaps (SFAC Report 2024).
• Caste- and gender-sensitive rural schemes: Social targeting is vital to correct inherited agrarian inequality. Eg: Mahila Kisan Sashaktikaran Pariyojana (MKSP) improved tribal women’s income by 25% in Chhattisgarh.
• Eg: Mahila Kisan Sashaktikaran Pariyojana (MKSP) improved tribal women’s income by 25% in Chhattisgarh.
• Climate-resilient crop planning: Adaptive support must replace cereal-centric incentives. Eg: Maharashtra’s bead-to-field cotton planning and Rajasthan’s bajra-focused MSP support raised drought-zone resilience (ICAR 2023).
• Eg: Maharashtra’s bead-to-field cotton planning and Rajasthan’s bajra-focused MSP support raised drought-zone resilience (ICAR 2023).
Conclusion Doubling farmers’ income was not a failed idea, but a misaligned execution in a diverse landscape. With robust local institutions, inclusive targeting, and structural corrections, India can still translate the ambition into reality for its farmers.
General Studies – 4
Q8. “Acts of disloyalty by security personnel undermine the moral fabric of the nation”. Comment. How can character-building be institutionalised in security forces? (10 M)
Introduction Loyalty in uniformed service is a sacred duty, not just a professional expectation. When breached, it creates not only a security threat but weakens the ethical foundation of public trust in state institutions.
Acts of disloyalty and their ethical impact on the nation
• Breach of public trust: Disloyalty erodes citizens’ faith in the institutions meant to defend them.
• Eg: The May 2025 CRPF ASI’s arrest by NIA for sharing sensitive data with Pakistan’s intelligence shows how a single betrayal affects national credibility.
• Threat to collective security and morale: Such acts compromise classified missions and demoralise fellow personnel.
• Eg: In the 2019 Naval espionage case, ISI links through honey-trapping affected multiple naval units.
• Violation of oath and constitutional duty: Personnel pledge allegiance to the Constitution and nation under Article 311, making betrayal not just illegal but unethical.
• Eg: The dismissed CRPF ASI was removed under Article 311(2)(b) for breaching service conduct rules.
• Ripple effect on institutional culture: One ethical lapse may normalise corrupt conduct if not addressed systematically.
• Eg: Repeated cases of spying from border forces in Rajasthan and Punjab have led to greater mistrust and over-policing in units.
• Encouragement of external manipulation: Betrayal by insiders emboldens foreign adversaries to exploit more vulnerabilities.
• Eg: Pakistan’s use of monetary inducements and emotional coercion has exploited weak ethical foundations among low-level personnel.
Institutionalising character-building in security forces
• Incorporating value education in training: Ethics must be taught beyond rulebooks, using moral dilemmas and real-world scenarios.
• Eg: The BSF Academy in Tekanpur integrated ethics-based simulation training post-2022 discipline concerns.
• Continuous psychological profiling: Periodic assessments can flag signs of ideological drift or emotional vulnerability.
• Eg: DRDO’s 2024 report recommended routine stress and loyalty tests in sensitive roles.
• Digital monitoring with accountability safeguards: Track online conduct without undermining personnel dignity.
• Eg: In the 2025 CRPF case, social media tracking flagged contacts with foreign handlers.
• Mentorship and peer monitoring systems: Senior officers should guide junior staff on ethical conduct through example and counsel.
• Eg: The 2023 ITBP ‘Moral Anchors’ programme assigns mentors to reinforce integrity.
• Recognition of moral courage: Honouring personnel for resisting unethical temptations builds a culture of pride in values.
• Eg: COAS commendation medals for non-combat integrity cases help establish positive peer influence.
Conclusion Security without ethics is a façade. India’s internal stability depends not just on arms and infrastructure, but on the moral strength of those entrusted to defend it. Character-building must thus be treated as a national investment in resilience.
Q9. “Silence in the face of moral wrong is complicity”. Analyse. What role do moral courage and whistle-blowing play in preventing such acts of injustice? (10 M)
Introduction: When individuals or institutions stay silent during wrongdoing, they enable and perpetuate injustice. True ethics demands action rooted in conscience, even when inconvenient.
“Silence in the face of moral wrong is complicity”: Ethical analysis
• Ethical abdication legitimises injustice: Silence offers implicit approval, weakening moral resistance in society. Eg: 2020 Hathras case showed how administrative silence delayed justice, until media and public pressure forced accountability (NHRC Report 2020).
• Eg: 2020 Hathras case showed how administrative silence delayed justice, until media and public pressure forced accountability (NHRC Report 2020).
• Violation of constitutional morality: Public servants have a duty under Article 51A(h) to develop a scientific temper and stand against social wrongs. Eg: The 2023 Delhi hit-and-run case revealed indifference by bystanders and enforcement agencies, eroding the spirit of constitutional ethics.
• Eg: The 2023 Delhi hit-and-run case revealed indifference by bystanders and enforcement agencies, eroding the spirit of constitutional ethics.
• Undermines rule of law: Complicity through silence shifts justice from institutions to majoritarian forces or mobs. Eg: In Aligarh 2025 lynching case, initial inaction risked legitimising mob behaviour until forensic reports contradicted the mob’s claims (PTI, May 2025).
• Eg: In Aligarh 2025 lynching case, initial inaction risked legitimising mob behaviour until forensic reports contradicted the mob’s claims (PTI, May 2025).
• Normalisation of impunity: Regular silence in such cases makes injustice a societal norm, not an exception. Eg: Lack of prosecution in cow vigilantism cases in parts of Haryana and UP has emboldened repeat offences (IndiaSpend analysis, 2023).
• Eg: Lack of prosecution in cow vigilantism cases in parts of Haryana and UP has emboldened repeat offences (IndiaSpend analysis, 2023).
Role of moral courage in preventing injustice
• Empowers ethical resistance: Moral courage drives individuals to confront authority and risk personal loss to uphold justice. Eg: Durga Shakti Nagpal, 2013, acted against illegal sand mining despite political pressure, showing ethical fortitude in civil service.
• Eg: Durga Shakti Nagpal, 2013, acted against illegal sand mining despite political pressure, showing ethical fortitude in civil service.
• Protects vulnerable voices: Moral courage allows civil servants and citizens to amplify unheard or oppressed sections. Eg: Justice H.S. Bedi’s dissent in police encounter cases upheld the rights of tribals and marginalised in Gujarat (2019 SC-constituted panel).
• Eg: Justice H.S. Bedi’s dissent in police encounter cases upheld the rights of tribals and marginalised in Gujarat (2019 SC-constituted panel).
• Sets ethical precedent: One act of courage can inspire collective moral awakening in institutions. Eg: Kiran Bedi’s policing model in Tihar jail promoted human dignity and prison reform, becoming a benchmark for ethical administration.
• Eg: Kiran Bedi’s policing model in Tihar jail promoted human dignity and prison reform, becoming a benchmark for ethical administration.
Role of whistle-blowing in preventing injustice
• Exposes hidden misconduct: Whistle-blowers make unseen unethical practices public, ensuring accountability. Eg: Anand Rai’s role in exposing the Vyapam scam led to large-scale arrests and judicial scrutiny (2015–2017).
• Eg: Anand Rai’s role in exposing the Vyapam scam led to large-scale arrests and judicial scrutiny (2015–2017).
• Deters institutional rot: Potential whistle-blowing creates internal pressure on organisations to maintain integrity. Eg: The Infosys ethics complaint (2019) led to internal audits, showing how such acts push for organisational self-correction.
• Eg: The Infosys ethics complaint (2019) led to internal audits, showing how such acts push for organisational self-correction.
• Needs protective legal frameworks: The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2014 remains unnotified, leaving whistle-blowers vulnerable. Eg: Murder of Satyendra Dubey (NHAI engineer, 2003) revealed gaps in institutional safety for ethical dissenters.
• Eg: Murder of Satyendra Dubey (NHAI engineer, 2003) revealed gaps in institutional safety for ethical dissenters.
• Strengthens ethical democracy: Whistle-blowing reinforces transparency, especially when supported by institutions like the CVC and RTI Act, 2005. Eg: The RTI-based exposure of the MGNREGA ghost workers scam in Rajasthan (2021) helped recover misappropriated funds and sparked reforms.
• Eg: The RTI-based exposure of the MGNREGA ghost workers scam in Rajasthan (2021) helped recover misappropriated funds and sparked reforms.
Conclusion: An ethical society does not tolerate silence in the face of injustice. Empowering moral courage and institutionalising whistle-blower protections are essential to build a public culture of conscience-driven action.
Q10. Proximity to political power must not translate into administrative overreach. Justify with reasons. What ethical red flags emerge from bureaucratic allegiance to political interests? (10 M)
Introduction Ethical public service demands impartiality and autonomy. When proximity to political power compromises bureaucratic objectivity, it corrodes public trust and leads to governance capture.
Justification against administrative overreach
• Violation of political neutrality: Bureaucrats must act as neutral implementers, not political extensions. Eg: Santhanam Committee (1962) emphasised neutrality as a core administrative ethic, warning against bureaucratic politicisation.
• Eg: Santhanam Committee (1962) emphasised neutrality as a core administrative ethic, warning against bureaucratic politicisation.
• Undermining rule of law: Exercising power beyond legal mandate dilutes constitutional governance. Eg: In the Chhattisgarh DMF scam (2025), undue influence in tender processes by officials close to power bypassed legal procedures, violating Articles 14 and 16.
• Eg: In the Chhattisgarh DMF scam (2025), undue influence in tender processes by officials close to power bypassed legal procedures, violating Articles 14 and 16.
• Erosion of institutional credibility: Overreach damages public confidence in administrative fairness. Eg: The T.N. Seshan reforms in the Election Commission upheld independence by resisting political interference, restoring credibility and public trust.
• Eg: The T.N. Seshan reforms in the Election Commission upheld independence by resisting political interference, restoring credibility and public trust.
• Subversion of merit-based processes: Preferential actions due to political proximity compromise public service values. Eg: Ashok Khemka case showed frequent transfers due to resisting political pressure, raising concern over integrity vs. loyalty.
• Eg: Ashok Khemka case showed frequent transfers due to resisting political pressure, raising concern over integrity vs. loyalty.
• Conflict of interest and partial decision-making: Overreach often leads to unethical favouritism. Eg: 2023 Maharashtra transfers audit by CAG revealed politically driven postings without public interest rationale.
• Eg: 2023 Maharashtra transfers audit by CAG revealed politically driven postings without public interest rationale.
Ethical red flags in political allegiance
• Misuse of delegated authority: Power is misapplied for non-public ends, violating fiduciary duty. Eg: Saumya Chaurasia’s role in the DMF scam (2025) involved influencing contracts due to proximity to ex-CM’s office, breaching conduct rules.
• Eg: Saumya Chaurasia’s role in the DMF scam (2025) involved influencing contracts due to proximity to ex-CM’s office, breaching conduct rules.
• Compromise of public interest: Decisions skewed towards political goals harm collective welfare. Eg: In the Telangana Kaleshwaram project scrutiny (2024), inflated costs were linked to politically aligned bureaucrats overriding due process.
• Eg: In the Telangana Kaleshwaram project scrutiny (2024), inflated costs were linked to politically aligned bureaucrats overriding due process.
• Breakdown of accountability chains: Allegiance displaces answerability to the Constitution and citizens. Eg: Yogendra Narain Committee (2003) recommended restoring civil services’ allegiance to Constitution, not individuals.
• Eg: Yogendra Narain Committee (2003) recommended restoring civil services’ allegiance to Constitution, not individuals.
• Suppressing dissent and ethical voices: Officers resisting illegality face career threats, deterring ethical behaviour. Eg: Durga Shakti Nagpal’s suspension (2013) after cracking down on sand mafia reflected political retaliation, stifling integrity.
• Eg: Durga Shakti Nagpal’s suspension (2013) after cracking down on sand mafia reflected political retaliation, stifling integrity.
• Normalization of corruption as a governance tool: Loyalty replaces legality, fostering rent-seeking ecosystems. Eg: Coal scam (2012) saw bureaucrats enabling illegal allocations to politically favoured firms, breaching Section 13(1)(d) of PCA.
• Eg: Coal scam (2012) saw bureaucrats enabling illegal allocations to politically favoured firms, breaching Section 13(1)(d) of PCA.
Conclusion Unethical proximity to political power is not just a procedural breach—it is a betrayal of the public mandate. Institutionalising ethical insulation is critical to sustain democratic integrity and administrative justice.
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