Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021
Kartavya Desk Staff
Source: TH
Subject: Indian Judiciary
Context: The Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021 as unconstitutional for violating judicial independence and the doctrine of separation of powers.
• The Court also directed the Union Government to establish a National Tribunal Commission within four months and restored the earlier safeguards laid down in the Madras Bar Association (MBA) IV & V judgments.
About Supreme Court struck down key provisions of the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021:
What is the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021?
• Enacted on 13 August 2021, it sought to restructure and rationalise the tribunal system by abolishing several appellate tribunals and consolidating provisions on appointments, tenure and service conditions of tribunal members.
• It replaced the Tribunal Reforms Ordinance, 2021 and became the primary statute governing many central tribunals.
Aims of the Act:
• To reduce delay by shifting many appellate functions from tribunals to High Courts.
• To standardise appointments and service conditions across tribunals.
• To enhance administrative efficiency and accountability by giving the Centre a more central role in managing tribunals.
Key Features:
• Abolition of Tribunals: Dissolved bodies like the Film Certification Appellate Tribunal, Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Airport Appellate Tribunal, etc., transferring their jurisdiction to High Courts / other courts.
• Centralised Appointments: Chairpersons and Members to be appointed by the Central Government on recommendation of a Search-cum-Selection Committee chaired by the CJI or nominee.
• Tenure & Age: Chairperson – 4-year term or till 70 years (whichever earlier). Members – 4-year term or till 67 years. Minimum age for appointment fixed at 50 years, excluding younger practitioners.
• Chairperson – 4-year term or till 70 years (whichever earlier).
• Members – 4-year term or till 67 years.
• Minimum age for appointment fixed at 50 years, excluding younger practitioners.
• Executive Rule-Making Power: Centre empowered to frame rules on salaries, allowances and service conditions and to amend the Schedule (list of tribunals) by notification.
• Transitional Provisions: On abolition, members ceased office; pending cases shifted to High Courts/other courts.
Supreme Court Judgment On The Act (2025):
• The Court held that the Act violates constitutional principles of separation of powers and judicial independence and amounts to an impermissible “legislative override” of binding Supreme Court decisions (especially MBA IV & V).
• It struck down the impugned provisions that: Re-introduced a 4-year tenure, Imposed minimum age 50 years, Allowed a panel of two names per vacancy for the government to choose from, Tied service conditions to equivalent civil servants.
• Re-introduced a 4-year tenure,
• Imposed minimum age 50 years,
• Allowed a panel of two names per vacancy for the government to choose from,
• Tied service conditions to equivalent civil servants.
Key Reasoning:
• Parliament cannot re-enact, in slightly altered form, provisions already struck down, without curing the underlying constitutional defects.
• Judicial directions on minimum tenure, eligibility of advocates with 10 years’ practice, composition and role of selection committees are not “abstract principles” but constitutional requirements flowing from Articles 323A–323B, Article 14 and the basic structure (judicial independence).
• The Act tried to restore executive dominance over tribunals where the Union is often the largest litigant, undermining institutional autonomy.
Directions Issued:
• National Tribunal Commission to be constituted within 4 months as an “essential structural safeguard” for tribunal independence, appointments, administration and oversight.
• Till a new law consistent with earlier judgments is enacted, directions in Madras Bar Association (MBA IV & V) on tenure, eligibility, age limits, and composition of selection committees will continue to govern.
• Appointments already made pursuant to selections completed before the Act came into force are protected and governed by the parent statutes and MBA IV & V, not by the truncated tenure in the Act.
Arguments In Favour of the Tribunal Reforms Act:
• Streamlining & Rationalisation: Supporters argued that abolishing small, under-utilised tribunals and shifting work to High Courts would reduce fragmentation and improve consistency of judicial review.
• Uniformity & Administrative Clarity: A single law with common rules on appointments and service conditions was projected as bringing predictability and uniform standards across multiple tribunals.
• Executive Efficiency in Appointments: Greater Central control was justified on grounds of speed and coordination—a single nodal authority supposedly prevents delays caused by multiple ministries and bodies.
• Experience-Based Age Threshold: The 50-year minimum age was defended as ensuring that only mature, experienced candidates (often retired judges/bureaucrats) preside over complex technical disputes.
• Shorter, Fixed Tenure: A 4-year tenure was portrayed as enabling performance review and rotation, preventing tribunals from becoming a “permanent sinecure” for select individuals.
Arguments Against the Tribunal Reforms Act:
• Violation of Judicial Independence: Short 4-year tenures and heavy executive control over re-appointments were seen as creating dependence on the government, especially when the Union is a key litigant before these bodies.
• Re-Enactment of Struck-Down Provisions: The Act brought back, in tweaked language, the same tenure and age rules already invalidated in MBA IV & V, amounting to a direct challenge to the Court’s authority.
• Exclusion of Younger Talent: The 50-year age bar blocks capable lawyers and domain experts in their 40s, weakening diversity and dynamism in tribunal composition.
• Executive Dominance in Appointments & Service Conditions: Giving the Centre a decisive say in appointments, service rules, salaries and allowances undermines the arm’s-length distance required for neutral adjudication.
• Burdening High Courts, Weakening Specialisation: Abolishing specialised tribunals and offloading cases to already overburdened High Courts was criticised as hurting access to justice and diluting technical expertise.
Way Ahead:
• Enact a Fresh, Constitution-Compliant Tribunal Law: Parliament should legislate in line with MBA IV & V and the 2025 judgment—ensuring minimum 5-year tenure, reasonable age limits, and security of service.
• Establish and Empower National Tribunal Commission: The proposed Commission must handle appointments, evaluation, infrastructure and administration of all tribunals, insulating them from day-to-day ministerial control.
• Balance Between Specialisation and Court Oversight: Maintain core specialised tribunals where technical expertise is crucial, while ensuring High Courts retain judicial supervision through appeals/judicial review.
• Transparent, Merit-Based Appointments: Clear criteria, public notifications, short-lists, and reasoned decisions by selection committees can enhance legitimacy and public trust.
• Strengthen Infrastructure & Digital Systems: Better staffing, digital case management, and timelines will make tribunals genuinely effective forums for speedy and specialised justice.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court’s verdict re-asserts that tribunal reform cannot be used as a backdoor to expand executive control over adjudication. By striking down the 2021 Act, the Court has reaffirmed constitutional supremacy and the centrality of judicial independence in our institutional design. Going forward, a robust National Tribunal Commission and a fresh, constitutionally aligned statute can turn tribunals into genuine instruments of speedy, specialised and impartial justice.
Tribunal design cannot be driven solely by executive convenience. Explain how recent judicial scrutiny highlights structural flaws in India’s tribunalisation. Analyse their impact on adjudicatory independence.