Expert Explains: How Iran’s response upset US-Israeli calculations, what it means for the Gulf’s future
Kartavya Desk Staff
By all stated American assumptions, preparations, and objectives, the military actions against Iran should have already ended with Israeli and American victory. The regime should have already collapsed and nuclear infrastructure decapitated to a point of no return. With the elimination of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, and several top leaders, Israel and the United States had achieved an unachievable task in just one hour. In their calculations, this was a way bigger victory than the capture of Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein. However, in the next few hours, hundreds of Iranian missiles and drones were on their way to hit Israeli targets and American bases in the neighboring Gulf, with many successfully destroying the targets. Israeli and American planners must have prepared for a bilateral military conflict, but by declaring American assets in the region as legitimate targets, Iran turned this traditional operation into a destabilising regional war, where the major stakeholders, the Gulf states, were never on board with the Americans and Israelis. More than condemnations, it was deep frustration that engulfed the region as the US military bases were seen as a liability, not protection against Iranian attacks. Iran made the removal of American bases from Gulf states the precondition to joining any dialogue for a ceasefire. Not just Iran’s problem In less than two weeks, it became clear that even if chaos and disorder wasn’t a goal, Israeli and American campaigns were going to embolden Iran for a greater armament and perhaps weaponisation of natural resources in the region, most importantly the Hormuz. The Iranian regime is far from collapse, and anti-regime Iranians are in deep mistrust about Israeli and American objectives. Not only the security and stability of the Middle East but also the global energy supply has been disrupted. All promises made to the Israeli and American public, regime change, and denuclearsation now demand more ammunition, more diplomatic support, massive financial and military resources, and most likely, boots on the ground. Several Israeli leaders have not ruled out the possibility of a ground operation, while American leaders are getting impatient and fear a stalemate sooner or later. Even a stalemate will be a victory for Iran to push the region for a new regional security architecture. The debate Pundits in Washington and Tel Aviv agree that the war is not going to end according to their ‘shock and awe’ strategy. The choice of war was prepared for time-bound achievables. The objective that keeps Israel and the United States together is that Iran must not be allowed a nuclear weapon. This goal has secured an international consensus among most of the stakeholders, including Iran’s Gulf neighbors, Türkiye, and Russia and China. This international consensus has deterred Iran from pursuing a nuclear weapon program and agreeing to the 2015 JCPOA agreement and the most recent dialogue on the eve of the air strikes. Iran also uses a theological position that making a nuclear weapon is un-Islamic, and Iran has no intention of having a nuclear weapon. But its continued and increased degree of uranium enrichment had been a source of mistrust. Iran says it will stop enrichment only when Iran’s right to have a civil nuclear programme, as an NPT signatory, is recognised. Iran has rejected shifting its nuclear energy programme to a foreign country. Several countries, including India, recognise Iran’s right to have a nuclear energy programme. The Israeli approach, however, seeks a radical solution, a complete denuclearisation and a complete disarming of Iran from weapons that could potentially threaten Israel in the future, including the ballistic missile programme. Most stakeholders, including some in the White House, do not agree with Israel’s radical approach and consider it unrealistic under international law. It is difficult for many countries to treat Iran and Israel differently on their nuclear ambitions and advanced missile programs. In this war, Iran has somehow convinced the Gulf nations that Israel’s military capabilities are not just against Iran but also against Gulf nations. The defence doctrines The pre-war preparations, the biggest since the Second World War, suggest the United States has indeed prepared for a long haul, relying on air power to cripple the regime’s survival. The United States and Israel were indeed aware that merely short-term airstrikes won’t be enough to stop Iran’s nuclear programme as long as this regime survives. The last war Israel had fought against a state actor was against Egypt in 1973. Since then, Israel’s military preparation and strategies have evolved mostly in confrontation with non-state actors, Hamas and Hezbollah. These asymmetrical wars have helped Israel as well as exposed it to state actors like Iran. When Iranian missiles successfully landed in Tel Aviv last June, Israel realised that it might not win against Iran alone. By damaging Iran’s economic and defence infrastructure, these airstrikes expect the Gulf nations to join the war at some stage, when the regime’s collapse appears imminent. In response, by targeting American bases in the Gulf, Iran has changed the scope of the war beyond a bilateral conflict. Iran has warned that it will target water desalination plants and oil refineries if its refineries are attacked. Iranian missiles were also directed to Türkiye and Cyprus, signaling that Iran was ready for a wider confrontation, a scenario that will drag Türkiye and NATO into the conflict. Iran’s defense doctrine will change to be more traditional through rapid militarisation, creating a new balance of power, and seeking conventional deterrence in the near future. ## Implications for the Gulf Despite the Iranian missile and drone attack deep into Gulf territories, the Gulf countries have remained patiently defensive. Senator Lindsey Graham and other American and Israeli politicians have been asking Saudi Arabia to join the war; however, the Gulf nations have avoided any confrontation with Iran. The Israeli and American operation found no street support in the Gulf. Contrary to that, there is growing anger and frustration against using the Gulf countries as a shield for Israeli security. Regional leaders echoed sentiments that Gulf security has been ignored for Israel. With the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement underway since 2023, Saudi Arabia no longer supports Israel’s radical approach against Iran. The Abraham Accord, which sought to unite Israel and the Gulf in establishing a new regional security order, is now off the table. Saudis and other Gulf states have started a search for an alternative security architecture. Omair Anas teaches International Relations at Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University, Türkiye.