Expert Explains: China’s softer reaction to war in Iran compared to Venezuela, and its concerns

With the United States and Israel having launched attacks against the Iranian regime in recent days, several reports in Western media organisations have argued that it is China that has incurred losses amid the turmoil in West Asia.

Some prominent examples include a recent report in The New York Times, which stated, “For China, Billions of Dollars Are at Risk from a Widening War”, pointing to its investments in the region over the years. The BBC also reported that “The Iran War is Unsettling China and its Ambitions.”

Such analyses are also linked to another common sentiment — of China’s apparent absence in the conflict, despite being a prominent player on the global stage. How exactly has China reacted, and what is the likely calculus behind it? Online commentary and official statements can help piece together its priorities.

China’s relatively muted reaction to Iran

China’s first reaction to the military strikes on Iran came on the night of February 28, the day the conflict began, with its official news agency, Xinhua, citing a Foreign Ministry spokesperson. “China is highly concerned over the military strikes against Iran launched by the United States and Israel,” the spokesperson said.

Subsequently, China has issued seven official statements, including at the United Nations, and its language of protest has changed in intensity — going from “concern” to “unacceptable” to “China strongly criticises” attacks on Iran. There was no mention of the word “condemn.”

In comparison, China’s official stance criticising US action around the “kidnapping and arrest” of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year was stronger in both tone and tenor.

Two things stand out in the carefully drafted official statements — by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and in the ministry’s press briefings — on Iran. First, authorities (the government and the Chinese Communist Party) have not “condemned” but “strongly criticised” the US-Israel military operation. The word “condemn” was used for the attack on a primary girls’ school in Iran that led to over 150 deaths, and after the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Second, China has been avoiding direct criticism of either US President Donald Trump or the US. In comparison, China officially condemned the action in Venezuela in January, terming it “bullying”.

At a press conference on the sidelines of an ongoing annual policy meeting in Beijing, Wang Yi sidestepped any direct criticism of the US when asked about Iran. He added that the bilateral ties were “back to an even keel after ups and downs” and that this would be a “big year” for ties. This suggests an attempt to ensure a smooth summit in Beijing later this month, when Trump will undertake his first visit to China in his second term, reflecting China’s priorities.

Beijing is not worried about energy security now…

These responses indicate not only the US angle, but also that China has emerged relatively unscathed from the fallout of the war so far. Despite the widespread belief that the war would damage China’s energy supply, some security experts in China say the impact will not be as severe.

Iran has been a major crude oil supplier to China, and over 30% of China’s imported crude oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Defying predictions, China has proved it is less vulnerable to surging oil prices, at least in the short-run. Energy experts, contrary to foreign policy analysts, have stated that China can withstand a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz more than many of its Asian peers. A recent analysis in CNBC Africa cited the planned diversification of energy imports, investments in renewable energy and large crude oil stockpiles for the assertion.

Thus, while China is Iran’s largest oil importer, it is not dependent on Iran for its fuel needs. Data based on China’s General Administration of Customs (GAC) suggests that West Asia comprised 41% of China’s fuel needs in 2025, and the country-wise share in descending order was Saudi Arabia (14%), Iraq (11%), the United Arab Emirates (7 %), Oman (6%), Kuwait (3%), and Qatar (1%). These ties also perhaps contributed to China’s limited official responses, lest it be seen as supporting Iran’s strikes on US military bases in these West Asian nations.

Fuel from Iran is not officially recorded due to Western economic sanctions, but international sources show that China imported 1.38 million bpd of crude from Iran in 2025, accounting for 12% of China’s total crude oil imports.

A recent analysis from The Guardian also noted that the conflict could have an unintended effect in deepening China’s reliance on Russia for fuel.

…but a long war will hurt its ambitions

While a protracted war might eventually dent China in terms of energy security, Beijing’s major concern is its flagship infrastructure investment plan, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in Eurasia.

Cao Xin, a Beijing-based strategic affairs expert, wrote in his column for ftchinese.com that “The damage to China’s interests from a US-Israeli war against Iran lies in the potential severe impact on the smooth implementation of ‘Belt and Road’ initiative and China’s plan to build a new Eurasian land bridge” through the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway.

The columnist further said that if the war ultimately results in social unrest or a new pro-American regime in Iran, China’s BRI is likely to face “considerable pessimistic uncertainty.”

This is perceived by many as a continuation of Trump’s “Donroe Doctrine,” which included Maduro’s arrest to emphasise US dominance in the Western hemisphere, and doubled as a signal to China’s ambitious BRI plans in Latin America.

Understanding Beijing’s stance

It’s clear from the Chinese “inaction” following the US military operations in both Venezuela and Iran that Beijing does not consider the countries as its close “allies” or “friends” in the same sense that America sees its security ties with its allies. Instead, Beijing sees them as having certain strategic interests.

A popular military affairs blogger, Zhao Han, had in February strongly rebuffed Khamenei’s annoyance at “China delaying the promised and long-due financial assistance to Tehran.” The blogger wrote, “For China, the Middle East is an important strategic area, but by no means its core interest (such as Taiwan, the South China Sea, sustainable development, and technological self-reliance.)”

To sum up, many strategic affairs experts in China are more alarmed about the potential damage to China’s long-term geopolitical and geostrategic interests owing to the conflict in West Asia, rather than its immediate energy needs. This growing realisation was perhaps explains why China cautioned against a return to the “law of the jungle”. “The Iran war should never have happened,” the Chinese foreign minister said earlier this week in their most direct criticism of the US and Trump.

*Hemant Adlakha taught Chinese at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. He is currently a Vice Chairperson and an Honorary Fellow at the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS), New Delhi.*