Declining Naxalism in India
Kartavya Desk Staff
Source: IE
Subject: Naxalism
Context: The surrender of Thippiri Tirupathi (alias Devuji), a top-ranking Maoist leader with a ₹1 crore bounty, marks a historic unravelling of the CPI (Maoist) leadership.
• This event, combined with the death of over 500 cadres since 2024, signals the potential endgame for the decades-old insurgency ahead of the government’s March 31 deadline.
About Declining Naxalism in India:
What it is?
• Naxalism, or Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), is an armed Maoist insurgency that seeks to overthrow the state through guerrilla warfare. For decades, it was described as India’s greatest internal security threat.
• However, it is now in a state of terminal decline, transitioning from a Red Corridor that once spanned ten states to isolated pockets in the Bastar region and the Jharkhand-Bihar border.
Key Statistics & Data:
• Leadership Attrition: The Maoist Politburo is down to one active member (Misir Besra) from a peak of nearly 50 central committee members.
• Neutralization Rate: Security forces killed 285 Maoists in 2025 and have neutralized 22 in the first two months of 2026.
• Total Casualties: More than 500 Maoists have been killed in operations since the beginning of 2024.
• Shrinking Footprint: LWE-affected districts have reduced from over 100 a decade ago to just a few highly active clusters today.
• Loss of Symbols: Over 100 Maoist memorials have been demolished by security forces to erase the insurgency’s physical and psychological dominance.
Reasons for the Decline:
• Leadership Crisis: The core Telugu leadership that steered the movement for decades has been decimated by surrenders and deaths.
E.g. The surrender of Devuji and strategist Sonu (2025) has left the rank-and-file without ideological or tactical guidance.
• Aggressive Security Posture: The Greyhounds of Telangana and the COBRA units have shifted from defensive to proactive offensive operations.
E.g. The 2024-25 surge in neutralizations shows security forces are now entering no-go zones in South Bastar.
• Vacuum in Ideology: Modern tribal youth are more interested in digital connectivity and jobs than the Maoist People’s War ideology.
E.g. The lack of new, young recruits from Telangana/Andhra has forced the party to rely on lower-rung, less-educated militia.
• Infrastructural Penetration: The construction of roads and mobile towers in remote forests has broken the Maoists’ geographical advantage.
E.g. The Road Requirement Plan (RRP) in Sukma and Bijapur has allowed security forces to reach ambush points within minutes rather than days.
• Enhanced Intelligence: Real-time drone surveillance and technical intelligence have made it impossible for large Maoist Platoons to move undetected.
E.g. The pinpoint precision of the May 2025 operation that killed Nambala Keshav Rao highlights superior technical tracking.
Key Initiatives Taken:
• Operation SAMADHAN: A comprehensive strategy focusing on Smart Leadership, Aggressive Strategy, Motivation, Actionable Intelligence, and Dashboard-based KPIs.
• Aspirational Districts Programme: Focused development in 35 LWE-hit districts to improve healthcare, education, and financial inclusion.
• ROSHNI Scheme: A special placement-linked skill development initiative specifically targeting tribal youth in LWE-affected areas.
• Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: Offering high cash incentives (e.g., ₹1 crore for top leaders) and land to encourage insurgents to join the mainstream.
Remaining Challenges:
• Hardened Pockets: Small, elusive units continue to hold out in the densest Abujhmad forests where terrain favors the guerrilla.
E.g. Continued sporadic ambushes in Bastar prove that while the army is gone, snipers remain active.
• Inter-State Coordination: Maoists often jump across state borders (e.g., Odisha-Chhattisgarh) to exploit jurisdictional gaps.
E.g. Leaders like Misir Besra remain active by moving between the difficult terrains of Jharkhand and Bihar.
• Governance Deficit: In the most remote hamlets, the delivery of basic services like clean water and healthcare still lags.
E.g. Maoists still exploit local grievances in Sukma regarding land rights and forest produce pricing.
• Overground Fronts: Intellectual support groups and frontal organizations still provide a legal and logistical smokescreen.
E.g. Intelligence reports suggest that even as leaders surrender, urban networks still try to radicalize university students.
• Weaponry and IEDs: The use of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) remains a low-cost, high-casualty tool for insurgents.
E.g. The frequent IED blasts targeting security convoys in Dantewada show their ability to disrupt peace despite low manpower.
Way Ahead:
• Sustaining Development: Ensure that the surrender of the insurgency is followed by the arrival of the state through permanent schools and hospitals.
• Tribal Language Outreach: Use local Gondi and Halbi languages for government communication to counter Maoist propaganda.
• Strengthening Local Police: Gradually replace Central Forces (CRPF) with local police who have better human intelligence and cultural ties.
• Focus on Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs): Invest in better technology to safeguard troops against IEDs during the final stages of the clearance.
• Border Sealing: Use satellite mapping to monitor movements across the Tri-junction borders of Odisha, Chhattisgarh, and Maharashtra.
Conclusion:
The unravelling of the CPI (Maoist) leadership signals that the movement has lost its strategic depth and ideological fire. While lone-wolf attacks may persist, the era of organized Maoist insurgency in India is effectively reaching its twilight. The challenge now lies in ensuring that development reaches the last mile to prevent any future resurgence of extremism.
Q. “The state has succeeded in degrading Naxalism’s armed capacity, but has not fully resolved the structural anxieties that first made insurgency thinkable”. Discuss. (15 M)