Ayatollah Khamenei dead: How India-Iran ties have fared since the 1979 Iranian Revolution

On Sunday (March 1), Iran’s official news agency IRNA confirmed that the country’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had been killed in the strikes conducted by the US and Israel in Tehran the previous day. IRNA also confirmed that the commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohammad Pakpour, and the secretary of Iran’s Defence Council, Ali Shamkhani, had also been killed. This has raised questions about what lies ahead for the clerical regime, which has been in power since the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and how India — with its long history of ties with Iran — can navigate this current dynamic situation. Here’s a look at how India’s relations with Iran have evolved since 1979. ## 1979: The year that changed everything Although the two countries have had a history of ties stretching back millenia, diplomatic ties in the 20th century began with a “friendship treaty” signed on March 15, 1950, which reflected the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s policy of non-alignment and mutual regional cooperation. Although India did engage constantly with the monarchist regime under the Shah of Iran during the Cold War, the Shah’s inclinations towards the US and his attempts to establish close relations with Pakistan meant there was no strategic alignment. But the 1979 uprising, which saw the Shah being deposed and the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power (Ali Khamenei subsequently became Supreme Leader in 1989), reshaped not just India’s approach to West Asia but the entire balance of power in the region. Although the new Ayatollah-led regime initially dissociated itself from both the Cold War-era blocs led by the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union, it also extended its hands towards the Non-Aligned Movement (of which India was a founder member). Meanwhile, India’s own foreign policy approach was undergoing a shift in the 1980s: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was trying to improve bilateral relations with the US — as opposed to his predecessor (and mother) Indira Gandhi, who had signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets in 1971. But what worked in India’s favour was Iran distancing itself from Pakistan, which was a formal strategic ally of the US at the time. Earlier, India used to buy oil from Iran (among other West Asian countries) and supplied labour, engineering services, and manufactured goods. Even though the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) forced India to shift its oil purchases to other Gulf countries, India’s neutral position meant it continued to build working economic and political relations with Iran. Iran was also instrumental in raising frequent objections to Pakistan’s anti-India resolutions in forums such as the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference), among others. Another incident in 1979 — the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — brought out the nuanced dynamics of Iran’s evolving relations vis-a-vis India and Pakistan. While Iran’s clerical regime opposed the invasion and coordinated covert support for the Afghan mujahideen (guerrilla forces) with Pakistan throughout the 1980s, it also worked with Russia and India in supporting the Northern Alliance to limit the influence of the Pakistan-backed Taliban forces in the 1990s. Reaching a zenith The end of the Cold War in 1991 saw both countries move closer, with Iran assuming a “Look to the East” policy towards Asian countries while India attempted to assert its position as an emerging world power. In a July 2025 brief for the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), researcher Sandeep Bhardwaj wrote: “At a deeper level, developing relations with Iran allowed India to expand its options. Protective of its strategic autonomy, New Delhi was discomfited by the post-1991 American hegemony over the world. It sought to retain greater manoeuvre room for itself by signalling its willingness to work with nations ostracised by the United States (US)-led Western order. India also believed it was helping maintain global stability by acting as a pressure release valve for the countries targeted by Washington.” In 1993, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao visited Tehran. This bilateral visit included discussions on two major points: the construction of a pipeline to supply Iranian gas to India, and enabling India to build transit facilities in Iran for supplying Indian goods to landlocked Central Asian countries. When Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani came to India two years later, the signing of a major trade accord and five bilateral agreements confirmed the consolidation of bilateral ties. India-Iran cooperation deepened around the turn of the millennium: Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s April 2001 visit to Iran saw the signing of the Tehran Declaration, and the return visit of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami in January 2003 (he was Chief Guest during the Republic Day parade that year) led to the New Delhi Declaration. This heralded the elevation of the relationship to a strategic partnership “for a more stable, secure and prosperous region and for enhanced regional and global cooperation”. Another significant provision of the Declaration was to enhance bilateral defence cooperation, which has faced obstacles in the form of India’s growing reliance on Israel for defence equipment over the years. ## Ties in the 21st century In the 2000s, India eventually became one of the largest importers of Iranian crude oil: in 2009, it imported about 22 million tonnes of crude oil worth $10 billion. India has also invested in Iran’s ports and energy infrastructure, most notably in the development of the Chabahar port’s container terminal project. This was seen as a way of countering Chinese influence in the region, which built the Gwadar port in Pakistan’s Balochistan province that borders Iran. In May 2016, following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Iran visit, 12 memorandums of understanding and agreements were signed, including the “Trilateral Agreement on Trade, Transport and Transit between India, Iran and Afghanistan”. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s February 2018 visit also furthered the bilateral relationship. In the meantime, India had sought to capitalise on the West’s outreach to Iran through the signing of the landmark Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, colloquially known as the Iran nuclear deal) in 2015. In 2017, Iran’s oil exports to India reached an all-time high. However, during Donald Trump’s first presidential term (2017-21), the US’ 2018 unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and its subsequent sanctions meant that India had to eventually discontinue importing Iranian oil in 2019. As of now, the two countries have in place several bilateral consultative mechanisms at various levels and joint working groups to facilitate cooperation in various sectors of mutual interest. Both remain trade partners, with major Indian exports to Iran including rice, tea, sugar, pharmaceuticals, manmade staple fibers, electrical machinery, and artificial jewellery whereas major Indian imports from Iran consist of dry fruits, chemicals, and glassware. But as Bhardwaj points out in the ISAS brief, the US’ pressure campaign has effectively “whittled India-Iran relations to a nub” and that most commercial and infrastructure projects have stalled or died, including the Chabahar port. Even though the Chabahar project managed to survive, it has also “failed to take off due to sanctions — only 450 vessels have visited it in the last six years”. Although the economic and strategic rationales for closer India-Iran ties still exist on paper, the two nations have drifted apart in the absence of any concrete link holding them together.” As Khamenei’s demise introduces a new set of uncertainties into the mix, Bhardwaj offers a portrait of the sobering reality that encapsulates the bilateral relationship as it stands: “Although the economic and strategic rationales for closer India-Iran ties still exist on paper, the two nations have drifted apart in the absence of any concrete link holding them together. New Delhi’s inability to navigate Washington’s maximum pressure campaign to preserve some degree of its relationship with Tehran hints at the shrinking room for India to manoeuvre geopolitically.” Abhinav Chakraborty is a journalist with a keen interest in politics, world affairs, features, and long form. He is a former HR professional with experience across People Operations. ... Read More